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Abstract	
	Ontic	structural	realism	(OSR)	is	at	its	core	the	view	that	structure	is	ontologically	fundamental.			Informed	from	its	inception	by	the	revolutions	of	20th	century	science,	it	is	claimed	to	provide	the	perspective	on	ontology	most	befitting	of	modern	physics.		But	what	precisely	its	core	claim	that	‘structure	is	fundamental’	amounts	to	is	difficult	to	articulate,	as	is	what	its	purported	naturalistic	credentials	should	ultimately	be	taken	to	be.	It	is	also	difficult	to	sustain	OSR’s	core	claim	on	the	basis	of	our	best	current	physics.		What	is	clear,	however,	is	that	OSR	has	brought	swathes	of	relevant	material	from	the	sciences	to	the	table	of	contemporary	metaphysics,	and	that	metaphysicians	ignore	this	rich	seam	of	material	to	their	own	analytical	loss.		This	article	aims	to	identify	different	positions	within	OSR	and	the	connections	between	them,	and	examine	the	warrant	provided	by	our	best	current	physics	for	the	claim	that	structure	is	ontologically	fundamental.		It	will	be	argued	that	kind	properties	continue	to	pose	a	challenge	to	OSR	–	something	that	has	perhaps	been	obscured	by	the	fact	that	ontological	priority	has	primarily	been	conceived	of	in	terms	of	ontological	dependence	and	not	a	relation	of	ontological	determination	(or	‘grounding’).		As	such,	it	is	argued,	it	seems	difficult	to	maintain	the	fundamentality	of	structure	on	the	basis	of	present	physics.		But	another	hope	is	to	convey	that	OSR	must	incorporate	both	the	fine	details	of	contemporary	physics	and	tools	from	a	
priori	metaphysics	in	the	course	of	its	development,	and	as	such	that	metaphysicians	of	all	stripes	have	not	only	a	stake	in	the	standing	of	its	claims	but	a	role	to	play	in	the	argument	behind	them.			 	
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Ontic	Structural	Realism	
		
1.	Introduction			While	a	number	of	distinct	positions	go	under	the	banner	of	ontic	structural	realism	(OSR),	 common	 to	 them	 is	 the	 insistence	 that	 the	 structural	 features	 of	 reality	should	 be	 accorded	 ontologically	 fundamental	 status.	 	 While	 structuralist	philosophies	have	resurfaced	periodically	under	a	variety	of	motivations,	 the	chief	selling	 point	 of	 OSR	 today	 is	 its	 claim	 to	 be	 the	metaphysic	most	 befitting	 of	 21st	century	 physics.1		 Though	 its	 focus	 on	 physics	 and	 its	 attendant	mathematics	 can	present	something	of	a	barrier	to	entry,	OSR	often	strikes	those	with	a	background	in	the	sciences	as	almost	a	revelation	–	as	a	philosophy	that,	unlike	its	more	moth-eaten	 predecessors,	 at	 last	 docks	 with	 their	 existing	 world-view.	 	 Indeed	structuralism	today	is	characterized	almost	as	much	by	its	naturalistic	credentials	as	it	 is	 by	 its	 ontological	 claims,	 with	 leading	 structuralists	 and	 their	 collaborators	having	 been	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 recent	 and	 sometimes	 excoriating	 critiques	 of	contemporary	a	priori	metaphysics.2		 In	that	sense,	ontic	structuralists	have	rather	fashioned	 themselves	 both	 as	 saviours	 of	 the	 discipline	 and	 the	 metaphysical	awkward	squad.				Given	the	centrality	of	both	methodological	and	fundamentality	concerns	to	so	much	recent	 discussion	 in	 metaphysics,	 OSR	 surely	 deserves	 to	 be	 engaged	 with	 by	metaphysicians	of	all	stripes.		But	what	partly	accounts	for	the	seeming	rediscovery	of	structuralist	theses	by	each	generation	is	the	distressing	tendency	of	those	theses	to	collapse	upon	close	examination.		Structuralisms	in	general	have	faced	a	battery	of	 objections,	 including	 that	 they	 trivialize	 knowledge,	 are	 conceptually	 or	dialectically	 incoherent,	 or	 –	 if	 they	 manage	 to	 escape	 these	 objections	 –	 are	insufficiently	 distinguished	 from	 their	 supposed	 rivals.		We	will	 see	 some	of	 these	allegations	surfacing	in	this	context	too.	 	We	will	see	also	that	securing	OSR	on	the	basis	of	our	best	current	science	faces	some	formidable	challenges.		But	 philosophical	 positions	 may	 ultimately	 fail	 to	 stand	 up	 and	 yet	 leave	 us	profoundly	 illuminated.	 	 	 In	what	 follows,	we	will	 try	 to	 isolate	what	 is	distinctive	and	 insightful	 about	 OSR,	 and	 what	 it	 can	 tell	 us	 about	 how	 to	 do	 metaphysics.	Rather	 than	 focus	 on	 the	 details	 of	 any	 central	 arguments,	 the	 aim	 will	 be	 to	navigate	 though	a	 sometimes	 confusing	dialectical	 landscape,	 and	hopefully	 in	 the	process	demystify	some	of	structuralism’s	more	recondite	claims.		While	presenting	just	a	cross-section	of	the	literature,	and	moreover	one	that	highlights	only	a	subset	of	 OSR’s	 applications	 and	 concerns,	 the	 hope	 is	 to	 convey	 something	 true	 of	 OSR	more	generally	 –	namely,	 that	 it	 requires	 for	 its	 articulation	 concepts	drawn	both	from	 technical	 physics	 and	 a	 priori	 metaphysics.	 	 In	 that	 sense,	 not	 only	 do	metaphysicians	 of	 all	 stripes	 have	 a	 stake	 in	 whether	 OSR	 succeeds,	 but	 also	 an	essential	role	to	play	in	bringing	it	to	the	point	where	it	can	stand	up	to	scrutiny	in	the	first	place.	
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2.	Structures,	objects,	and	‘mainstream	metaphysics’:	characterizing	OSR	
	Structuralist	philosophy	of	science	in	its	modern	incarnation	is	inaugurated	by	John	Worrall’s	seminal	paper	on	the	lessons	of	theory	change	in	science	(Worrall	1989)	–	the	 piece	 that	 coined	 the	 term	 ‘structural	 realism’.	 	 Worrall’s	 basic	 claim,	underpinned	by	observations	on	the	history	of	science,	was	that	all	we	can	have	any	theoretical	 confidence	 in	 is	 the	 structural	 relationships	 that	 unobservable	 objects	stand	in,	not	the	intrinsic	nature	of	those	objects	themselves.		As	the	epistemological	thesis	that	structure	is	all	we	can	reliably	know,	this	isn’t	OSR.		But	it	helps	to	have	in	mind	that	while	(as	is	frequently	maintained)	the	more	fundamental	something	is	ontologically,	 the	 more	 metaphysically	 secure	 its	 status,	 epistemologically	 the	situation	would	seem	to	be	completely	reversed.		The	most	fundamental	elements	of	the	 world	 are	 understood	 via	 theories	 formulated	 in	 an	 increasingly	 abstract	mathematical	 language,	 such	 that	 even	 the	 best	 of	 contemporary	 physicists	 oten	struggle	to	put	what	they	know	into	words.		Should	structuralism	help	transform	the	formalism	 of	 modern	 physics	 into	 something	 that	 could	 reasonably	 be	 called	 a	‘world	view’,	that	alone	would	secure	it	a	valuable	place	in	the	philosophy	of	science	corpus.		The	 starting	 point	 of	 contemporary	 structuralism	 in	 its	 ontic	 guise	 is	 standardly	taken	 to	be	 James	Ladyman’s	1998	What	is	Structural	Realism?,	 although	 that	was	itself	 a	 natural	 continuation	 of	 the	 arguments	 concerning	 identity	 in	 quantum	mechanics	developed	earlier	by	Steven	French.	(While	French	and	Ladyman’s	views	are	usually	 taken	 to	represent	 the	more	extreme	end	of	 the	spectrum,	discussions	and	 defences	 of	 different	 OSR	 positions	 still	 tend	 to	 be	 articulated	 in	 relation	 to	theirs.)	 	Perhaps	because	the	slogan	resonates	with	that	of	its	epistemic	precursor,	OSR	is	sometimes	crudely	characterized	as	the	doctrine	that	structure	is	all	there	is,	but	this	is	in	fact	too	narrow.		The	principal	bisection	of	OSR’s	doctrines	is	into	what	is	 known	 as	 eliminative	 structuralism	 and	 what	 we	 can	 call	 priority-based	structuralism.3 		 Eliminative	 structuralism	 gets	 its	 name	 because	 it	 holds	 that	physical	objects	are	 to	be	 ‘eliminated	 in	 favour	of	 the	relevant	structures’	 (French	2010,	 p.	 89).		 As	 such,	 this	 is	 the	 position	 that	 ‘structure	 is	 all	 there	 is’.	 	 Priority-based	structuralisms,	on	the	other	hand,	promote	the	view	that	structure	should	be	accorded	an	ontologically	fundamental	status.		The	‘stronger’	position	holds	that	it	is	
more	 fundamental	 than	 the	 objects	 of	 physics,	 and	 as	 such	 ontologically	 prior	 to	them.4		 A	 more	 moderate	 position	 holds	 that	 structure	 and	 objects	 are	 on	 an	ontological	par,	with	each	being	as	fundamental	as	the	other.5		All	of	these	versions	are	 taken	 to	 contrast	 with	 an	 ‘object-oriented’	 realism	 that	 is	 presented	 as	metaphysical	orthodoxy.6			One	 problem	 that	 structuralists	 face	 at	 this	 point	 is	 that	 ‘mainstream	metaphysicians’	 are	 likely	 to	 draw	 a	 blank	 if	 asked	 to	 state	 what	 this	 presumed	orthodoxy	 amounts	 to.	 	 Nor	 do	 I	 know	 of	 any	 very	 clear	 outline	 of	 it	 in	 the	structuralist	 literature.	 	 In	 places,	 the	 ‘object-oriented’	 position	 is	 presented	 as	
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involving	some	commitment	to	the	view	that	physical	objects,	such	as	particles	of	a	given	kind,	have	an	 ‘intrinsic	nature’,	which	seems	to	amount	to	the	idea	that	they	(i)	must	 be	 differentiated	 from	other	members	 of	 the	 same	 kind	 by	 some	 feature	intrinsic	to	them,	and	similarly	(ii)	are	such	that	their	properties	definitive	of	their	kind	are	intrinsic	properties.7	But	elsewhere	structuralists	argue	that	(ii)	may	not	be	in	tension	with	structuralism	(on	which	see	4.ii	below),	and	given	(for	example)	the	work	 that	 spatial	 relations	 have	 done	 in	 individuating	 objects	 historically	 it	 is	unclear	 to	 me	 who	 would	 insist	 upon	 (i).	 Certainly	 Lewis	 –	 the	 metaphysician	presented	as	naturalistic	bête	noir	perhaps	more	than	any	other	–	would	be	one	to	eschew	it.		Similarly,	while	it	has	been	alleged	that	what	OSRists	meant	by	‘structure’	has	not	been	clearly	articulated,	a	generous	reading	of	the	claim	that	structure	has	a	fundamental	status	likewise	seems	entirely	orthodox.8		For	one	obvious	articulation	of	 ‘metaphysical	structure’	is	just	the	notion	of	 ‘joints	in	nature’	that	does	so	much	work	 in	Lewis’s	 (and	more	recently,	Sider’s)	metaphysics,	and	even	 the	claim	that	objects	 are	 not	 a	 fundamental	 category	 is	 denied	 in	 Paul’s	 mereological	 bundle	theory.9		As	such,	it	seems	difficult	to	pin	down	at	the	outset	what	is	supposed	to	be	distinctive	about	OSR.		But	the	contrasts	may	come	into	sharper	relief	if	we	take	more	care	to	define	OSR’s	basic	 terms.	 	 Whether	 in	 its	 eliminativist	 or	 priority-based	 incarnations,	 ontic	structuralists	 make	 claims	 regarding	 the	 relative	 metaphysical	 status	 of	 two	categories	–	the	category	of	structure,	and	the	category	of	objects	–	and	more	should	be	 said	 about	 what	 these	 are	 taken	 to	 denote.	 	 Unfortunately,	 however,	 it	 seems	unlikely	that	a	crisp	definition	of	either	is	going	to	be	available,	or	even	appropriate.		For	 arguably	 physics	 has,	 in	 the	 course	 of	 its	 history,	 presented	 us	 with	 many	different	‘kinds	of	object’,	for	what	we	call	‘objects’	in	different	physical	frameworks	can	 be	 claimed	 to	 differ	 in	metaphysically	 significant	ways.	 	Whether	 in	 terms	 of	locality,	supervenience	structure,	trans-temporal	identity,	or	ontological	vagueness,	the	wavefunctions	and	fields	of	quantum	relativistic	physics	have	all	been	claimed,	at	 least	 by	 many	 philosophers	 of	 physics,	 to	 differ	 markedly	 from	 their	 classical	counterparts.	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 seems	 foolish	 to	 try	and	declare	once	and	 for	all	what	an	object	of	physics	is.				Perhaps	for	this	reason,	the	ways	that	structuralist	arguments	tend	to	proceed	is	not	by	giving	an	analysis	of	each	category	at	the	outset,	but	by	looking	into	theories	of	physics	 and	 simply	 identifying	 ostensively	 what	 should	 intuitively	 be	 counted	 as	examples.	 Thus	 particles,	 field,	 and	 spacetime	 points	 have	 all	 been	 identified,	essentially	 without	 argument,	 as	 paradigms	 of	 objects	 in	 physics.10		 Similarly,	
extrinsic	properties	and	relations	between	objects	–	paradigmatically,	entanglement	and	spatiotemporal	relations	–	have	been	identified	as	examples	of	structure.		Laws	
of	nature	–	special	sorts	of	relations	between	properties	–	have	also	been	identified	as	 structural	 entities,	 as	have	 the	higher-order	 structural	 features	of	 laws	 that	we	denote	as	dynamical	symmetries.		Thus	for	all	that	structuralism	has	been	accused	of	failing	to	provide	precise	criteria	for	these	basic	concepts,	since	it	is	physics	and	not	the	armchair	 that	 is	 supposed	 to	 supply	us	with	examples	 it	 is	hard	 to	 see	how	 it	could	be	any	other	way.			
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	With	that	(somewhat	apologetic)	clarification	 in	place,	 turn	now	to	thinking	about	the	rationale	for	the	various	forms	of	ontic	structuralism.			
3.	The	arguments	for	ontic	structuralism		
3.1	Eliminative	structuralism		Eliminative	 structuralism	 has	 been	 endorsed	 by	 both	 Steven	 French	 and	 James	Ladyman,	although	by	this	point	for	different	reasons.11		Suffice	to	say	the	claim	that	there	do	not	exist	objects	is	one	over	which	many	have	balked.		It	seems	plain	after	all	 that	 we	 see	 paradigm	 objects,	 such	 as	 laptops	 and	 coffee	 cups,	 scattered	 all	around	us	–	thus	inviting	what	we	might	call	the	incredulity	objection.		Furthermore,	if	 the	 structuralist	 strategy	 is	 to	 proceed	 as	 above,	 and	 thus	 characterize	what	 it	
means	 by	 the	 objects	 of	 physical	 theories	 in	 physics	 ‘ostensively’	 (as	 opposed	 to	analytically),	 it	 is	hard	to	see	how	the	claim	that	 ‘there	are	no	objects’	can	even	be	formulated	coherently.	 	Let	us	call	this	the	semantic	incoherence	objection.12		And	a	notorious	 objection	 to	 eliminativism	 is	 that	 if	 relations	 are	 –	 at	 least	 in	 the	entanglement	 and	 spatiotemporal	 cases	 –	 relations	 between	 objects,	 it	 seems	 we	cannot	 say	 that	 there	 exist	 the	 former	 and	 not	 the	 latter	 without	 resorting	 to	 a	perilous	Platonism.13		Let	this	last	be	the	metaphysical	incoherence	objection,	and	let	us	now	consider	how	eliminative	structuralists	might	respond	to	each	in	turn.	
		With	regard	to	the	incredulity	objection,	eliminativists	reassure	us	that	they	are	not	denying	that	 it	 is	true	 that	your	 laptop	and	coffee	mug	are	both	on	the	 table,	both	within	reaching	distance,	etc,	only	that	we	need	not	at	any	point	make	recourse	to	a	category	of	objects	in	order	to	account	 for	such	truths.14		As	such,	the	claim	is	that	objects	 constitute	 a	 dispensable	 category	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 making	 sense	 of	 the	world.	 	 The	 response	 to	 the	 semantic	 incoherence	 objection	 is	 quite	 different,	however,	 and	 raises	 some	 distinct	 puzzles.	 As	 noted,	 the	 problem	 is	 that	structuralists	 seem	 to	 convey	 what	 they	 mean	 by	 ‘object’	 through	 looking	 into	physics	 theories	 and	 identifying	 candidate	 examples	 –	 in	 the	 paradigm	 case,	quantum	particles	–	raising	the	question	of	how	we	can	coherently	deny	there	are	any.	 	 It	 seems	 their	 subsequent	 elimination	 is	 predicated	 on	 the	 claim	 that	 those	putative	 objects	 fail	 to	 meet	 some	 further	 criterion	 held	 to	 be	 necessary	 for	specifically	‘metaphysical’	commitment.		While	there	are	perhaps	other	criteria	that	could	have	been	cited	to	this	end,	that	which	has	been	appealed	to	in	this	context	is	the	 failure	 of	 physical	 theories	 to	 determine	whether	 they	 are	 individuals	or	non-
individuals.				Sadly,	 what	 precisely	 is	 intended	 by	 ‘non-individual’	 is	 something	 I	 myself	 have	always	struggled	to	get	a	grip	on.		But	what	is	clear	is	that	the	concept	is	intimately	related	to	whether	claims	about	the	 identities	and	distinctness	of	the	members	of	a	set	 can	 append	 claims	 about	 the	 set’s	 cardinality.15	The	 claim	 that	 this	 issue	 is	underdetermined	in	quantum	mechanics	is	often	predicated	on	the	following	facts:	
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that	 (1)	 the	 generic	 state	 of	 quantum	 particles	 is	 an	 entangled	 state;16	that	 (2)	entangled	particles	seem,	as	a	matter	of	empirical	 fact,	 to	only	 to	enter	 into	states	with	a	certain	symmetry;	and	that	(3)	those	symmetries	result	in	every	member	of	a	set	 of	 n	 entangled	 particles	 being	 attributed	 precisely	 the	 same	 set	 of	 properties	(both	intrinsic	and	extrinsic).17		With	no	physical	property	–	including,	it	should	be	noted,	position	properties	–	available	 to	render	 them	distinct,	 it	 is	claimed	we	are	faced	with	a	dilemma.		For	either	we	assume	that	the	entangled	particles	comprise	a	set	 of	 individuals	 in	 possession	 of	 some	 primitive	 metaphysical	 feature,	 such	 as	Lockean	 substratum	 or	 ‘primitive	 thisness’,	 which	 renders	 them	 metaphysically	distinct	from	each	other	despite	their	physical	indiscernibility;	or	infer	that	they	are	not	individuals,	that	the	language	of	identity	and	distinctness	does	not	apply	and	all	we	have	is	a	cardinality	claim	to	the	effect	that	there	exist	n	of	them.18		It	seems	our	best	theories	cannot	settle	which	it	is;	and	for	Ladyman,	at	least	circa	1998,	it	is	only	“an ersatz	 form	of	 realism	that	 recommends	belief	 in	 the	existence	of	entities	 that	have	such	ambiguous	metaphysical	status”	(Ladyman	1998,	p.	420).		As	such,	so	the	claim	seems	to	go,	objects	should	be	cast	to	the	flames.19		This	discussion	concerning	individuals	forms,	to	my	mind,	the	single	most	confusing	thicket	in	all	the	structuralist	literature.20		For	one	thing,	the	very	nature	of	the	move	is	confusing:	what	methodological	principle	of	metaphysics,	least	of	all	a	naturalistic	metaphysics,	can	trump	that	we	interpret	the	physics	as	providing	us	with	examples	of	objects,	that	we	can	then	metaphysically	theorize	about?	 	For	another	thing,	the	move	from	‘underdetermination	of	some	crucial	feature	of’	to	outright	 ‘elimination	of’	 just	 seems	 obviously	 over-hasty	 (at	 least	 for	 anyone	 with	 any	 metaphysical	sympathies	 at	 all),	 given	 how	 pervasive	 such	 underdetermination	 seems	 to	 be.21		More	 specifically,	 however,	 the	 issue	 of	 what	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 metaphysically	significant	 about	whether	 an	 object	 can	 be	 classed	 as	 an	 individual	 or	 not	 seems	never,	 or	 at	 least	 not	 to	me,	 to	 receive	 a	 crisp	 articulation,	 and	 seems	 especially	unclear	given	that	no-one	disputes	either	what	physical	properties	particles	have	or	that	their	associated	cardinalities	can	be	applied	either	way.22				In	 any	 case	 –	 as	 might	 come	 as	 something	 of	 a	 relief	 –	 the	 discussion	 over	eliminativism	has	 largely	 retreated	 from	 the	 supposed	 underdetermination	 of	 the	status	 of	 particles	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 individuality.	 	 Principally	 on	 account	 of	Saunders’	analysis	of	 identity	 in	quantum	mechanics	 	(on	which	more	below)	–	an	analysis	 that	 most	 take	 to	 have	 secured	 that	 particles	 are	 unambiguously	individuals,	and	without	any	imposition	of	‘primitive	thisness’	–	even	Ladyman	has	abandoned	 underdetermination	 as	 an	 underpinning	 for	 OSR.23		 Instead,	 the	 focus	has	shifted	instead	onto	what	makes	it	the	case	 that	particles	may	be	distinguished	from	 each	 other	 (and	 hence,	 apparently,	 secured	 as	 ‘individuals’).	 	 Nevertheless,	despite	the	(almost)	abandonment	of	the	argument	that	inaugurated	it,	the	language	of	eliminativism	persists,	as	other	arguments	have	been	given	for	the	eliminativist	point	of	view	–	both	of	which	have	been	marshaled	as	responses	 to	(what	we	have	called)	 the	 ‘metaphysical	 incoherence’	 objection.	 	 This	 objection,	 recall,	 is	 that	 if	relations	are	relations	between	objects	then	we	cannot	commit	to	the	former	without	also	committing	to	the	 latter.	 	One	response	eliminativists	have	 flirted	with	 is	 that	
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objects	might	decompose	into	relations	ad	infinitum:	that	what	seems	to	us	to	be	an	object	 might	 be	 ‘structures	 all	 the	 way	 down’.24	While	 the	 anti-fundamentalism	gestured	at	here	is	arguably	a	coherent	possibility,	there	is	at	present	no	empirical	reason	 to	 think	 that	 it	 is	 true.	 	 	 Thus	 the	 route	 more	 typically	 taken	 against	 the	charge	 of	 incoherence	 is	 to	 say	 that,	while	 the	 objects	are	 there,	 they	 are	merely	‘points	of	 intersection’	of	 the	relations	between	 them	–	a	claim	of	course	different	from	that	 in	which	putative	objects	resolve	themselves	 into	relations	distinct	 from	those	 in	 which	 they	 occur	 as	 relata.	 	 Either	 way,	 they	 are	 ‘offering	 a	reconceptualization	of	ontology,	at	the	most	basic	metaphysical	level,	which	effects	a	shift	from	objects	to	structures.’25		In	invoking	such	explicitly	reductionist	language,	eliminative	 structuralism	 leads	 naturally	 to	 the	 priority-based	 view,	 and	 in	particular,	 the	 ‘strong’	 view	 that	 structure	 alone	 is	 fundamental.	 Indeed	 strong	priority-based	 OSR	 simply	 is	 eliminative	 structural	 realism	 if	 we	 adopt	 the	seemingly	popular	metaphysical	view	that	only	that	which	is	fundamental	is	real.26		But	whether	or	not	we	share	that	view,	structuralism’s	success	is	now	seen	to	hang	on	 the	 viability	 of	 some	 priority-based	 view.	 	 Let	 us	 then	 consider	 the	 priority	relations	in	which	objects	and	structures	may	be	taken	to	stand.			
3.2	Priority-based	structuralism.				Priority-based	 structuralisms	 hold	 that	 relations	 and	 other	 structures	 of	 physics	have	a	claim	to	fundamental	status.		To	recap,	according	to	the	‘strong’	(sometimes	called	 the	 ‘radical’	 position),	 structures	 enjoy	 a	 one-way	 priority	 over	 objects;	according	to	the	‘moderate’	position,	the	so-called	‘priority’	is	reciprocated.27			As	we	have	 seen,	 eliminative	 structuralism,	 if	 based	 on	 a	 claim	 to	 reduce	 objects	 to	structures,	aligns	with	the	former	camp.		Now	to	be	clear,	in	saying	that	structures	are	 ‘more	fundamental’	 it	 is	not	being	claimed	that	structures	occupy	a	lower	 level	than	that	in	which	the	most	fundamental	objects	feature.		For	all	that	structuralism	has	 been	 vaguely	 associated	 with	 anti-fundamentalist	 thinking,	 it	 is	 completely	consistent	 with	 both	 versions	 of	 priority-based	 OSR	 to	 hold	 that	 there	 is	 a	fundamental	level	and	that	fundamental	particles	feature	in	it.		Rather,	structuralists	discern	metaphysical	 structure	within	 that	most	 fundamental	 level,	 arranging	 the	categories	of	entities	that	feature	there	into	relations	of	ontological	priority.					Given	 that	 (at	 least	 on	 a	 non-eliminativist	 view)	 everyone	 can	 agree	 what	 the	fundamental	 laws,	 objects,	 and	 relations	 are,	 and	what	 the	 levels	 structure	 of	 the	world	is,	some	will	see	the	transition	from	a	realism	in	which	objects	are	primary	to	one	where	they	are	not	to	constitute	a	mere	metaphysical	gestalt	switch	–	a	change	in	perception	that	fails	to	correspond	to	any	alteration	in	the	world	itself.		Since	the	
physical	structure	of	the	fundamental	 level	is	not	in	question,	and	the	sole	point	of	disagreement	 is	 the	 relative	 standing	 of	 ontological	 categories,	 OSR	 is	 an	unabashedly	metaphysical	thesis,	and	one	that	must	utilize	some	of	the	most	thickly	metaphysical	 concepts	 of	 the	 day.	 	 As	 such,	 OSR	 at	 its	 best	 will	 likely	 involve	collaboration	 between	 both	 mathematical	 whizzes	 and	 science-types,	 and	 their	
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more	dusty	philosophical	colleagues,	for	whom	making	fine	distinctions	of	precisely	this	sort	has	been	paying	the	rent	for	years.		In	any	case,	to	claim	that	structure	is	prior	to	objects	(or	vice	versa)	clearly	requires	the	 identification	 of	 a	 relation	 of	 priority.	 	 Most	 of	 the	 work	 on	 priority	 in	structuralism	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 objects	 ontologically	 depend	 (perhaps	reciprocally)	 on	 structures.28		While	 this	 extant	 literature	 is	 rich	 in	 insights,	 good	arguments	 can	 now	 be	 given	 that	 ontological	 dependence	 is	 not	 a	 relation	 of	ontological	priority	after	all.29		Instead,	it	is	increasingly	understood	that	priority	is	a	relation	 of	 ontological	 determination	 (as	 connoted	 by	 notions	 of	 ‘building’,	 or	‘bringing	about’),	without	the	need	for	any	concomitant	dependence	on	that	which	does	 the	 determining.	 	 As	 is	 by	 now	 almost	 universally	 acknowledged,	 such	 a	relation	must	be	more	fine-grained	than	mere	modal	correlation,	and	it	has	become	customary	to	denote	 this	relation	 ‘grounding’.30		Thus	the	supervenience	of	x	on	y,	while	 still	 necessary,	 is	 no	 longer	 sufficient	 for	 the	 priority	 of	 y	 over	 x.			Unfortunately,	 how	 to	 conceive	 of	 the	 extra	 ingredient	 that	 takes	 us	 from	 mere	correlation	to	genuine	grounding	–	indeed	even	whether	such	an	ingredient	can	be	specified	at	all	–	 is	much	disputed	in	a	priori	metaphysics.	 	Like	 it	or	not,	OSR	will	presumably	have	to	take	sides	on	this	issue	too.31	Nevertheless,	let	us	consider	how	far	 the	 physics	 alone	 can	 get	 us	 in	 defending	 the	 fundamentality	 of	 structure.			Luckily,	 many	 of	 the	 insights	 of	 the	 dependence-based	 discussion	 can	 be	straightforwardly	adapted	here.				Here	our	focus	will	be	on	matter	physics	(rather	than	spacetime	physics,	the	other	main	arena	of	structuralist	argument).		Let	us	take	it	that	in	order	to	be	classed	as	an	object	 a	 particle	must	 be	 the	 sort	 of	 thing	 that	 can,	 at	 least	 in	 principle,	 admit	 of	qualitative	duplicates	with	which	it	is	not	identical	–	for	otherwise,	one	might	hold,	the	contrast	of	a	particular	with	a	universal	is	lost.		As	such,	we	will	take	it	that	what	OSRists	must	 account	 for	 –	 ‘build’	 –	 are	 entities	with	 kind	properties	 distinct	 from	
other	members	of	the	same	kind.	 	Our	focus	will	be	on	issues	of	synchronic	identity,	and	to	keep	things	simple	let	us	focus	on	states	of	just	two	particles.		As	noted	above,	the	 generic	 state	 of	 a	 set	 of	 quantum	 particles	 is	 an	 entangled	 state,	 and	 the	properties	ascribable	to	an	object	 in	such	a	state	are	shared	by	all	with	which	it	 is	entangled.	 	 As	 such,	 no	 property	 –	 either	 intrinsic	 or	 extrinsic	 –	 can	 differentiate	them.	 	Saunders’	 insight,	 alluded	 to	above,	was	 that	particles	may	nevertheless	be	numerically	 discerned	 from	 one	 another	 via	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 entanglement	relation,	whose	irreflexive	nature	ensures	that	either	particle	is	not	identical	to	that	which	with	 it	 is	 entangled.	 	 Thus	 of	 all	 the	 physical	 features	 that	 could	 secure	 an	object’s	 distinctness	 from	 qualitative	 duplicates,	 it	 can	 in	 this	 case	 be	 only	 the	relations	 that	 exist	 between	 them.	 	 Moreover,	 one	 can	 show	 that	 entanglement	relations	are	strongly	non-supervenient	on	 the	properties	of	 the	relata,	and	hence	cannot	be	grounded	in	them.32		As	such,	it	seems	that	we	have	reason	to	claim	that	these	relations	are	 fundamental	and	 that	particles	–	at	 least	 stripped	of	 their	kind	properties	–	are	not:	 for	unless	we	are	 to	 sanction	a	primitive	and	naturalistically	problematic	 identity-conferring	 constituent,	 their	 distinctness	 and	 particularity	 is	determined	by	the	relations	between	them	alone.33			
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	Crying	out	 for	 comment	here	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 argument	 feels	 somewhat	out	of	step	 within	 the	 broader	 OSR	 dialectic.	 	 After	 all,	 the	 identity	 considerations	originally	used	to	support	it	explicitly	invoked	the	option	of	an	irreducible	identity-conferring	 feature,	 such	 as	 Lockean	 substratum	 or	 ‘primitive	 thisness’:	 for	 in	advance	of	Saunders’	 insight,	 it	was	only	these	that	could	support	 the	 ‘individuals’	interpretation	 that	 the	 physics	 was	 held	 to	 underdetermine.	 Why	 is	 it	 that	haeccieties	are	now	simply	ruled	out	ab	initio	as	a	ground	of	numerical	distinctness,	especially	given	that	(as	noted)	structuralists	are	happy	to	posit	other	unabashedly	metaphysical	 relations	 in	 the	 fundamental	 level?	 	 But	 in	 any	 case,	 the	 problem	of	securing	the	diversity	of	members	of	a	given	kind	has	historically	been	taken	to	be	more	favourable	to	OSR	than	that	of	accounting	for	the	kind	properties	themselves.		Here	the	issue	is	that	the	fundamental	kind	properties	–	such	as	mass,	charge,	and	the	(absolute	value	of)	spin	–	are	taken	to	be	essential	to	what	particles	are,	yet	they	also	standardly	taken	to	be	intrinsic	properties	of	them.	 	Since	intrinsic	properties	are	taken	to	be	paradigm	non-structural	features,	critics	have	claimed	that	the	idea	particles	are	‘built’	from	structures	is	for	this	reason	untenable.	34					But	structuralists	have	in	fact	always	had	a	story	to	tell	about	the	fundamental	kind	properties,	 even	 if	 its	 rather	more	mathematically	 involved	 has	 perhaps	 led	 to	 it	being	somewhat	overlooked.		Broadly	speaking,	two	strategies	have	been	adopted	to	deal	with	 the	 problem	posed	 by	 kind	 properties:	 these	 have	 been	 either	 to	 argue	that	the	kind	properties	are	not	in	fact	intrinsic	after	all,	or	that	–	whether	they	are	intrinsic	or	otherwise	–	 they	may	nevertheless	be	accounted	 for	 structurally.35		Of	these	 it	 is	 the	 second	 strategy	 that	 seems	 to	 have	 generated	 the	most	 discussion	historically,	and	it	places	the	notion	of	symmetries	in	physics	centre-stage.36		Whether	on	account	of	their	role	in	particle	prediction,	numerical	computation,	the	heuristics	 of	 theory	 construction,	 or	 just	 scientific	 understanding	 in	 general,	 the	importance	of	symmetries	to	modern	physics	is	impossible	to	overstate.		Largely	in	consequence,	how	to	conceptualize	symmetries	has	become	a	philosophical	topic	in	its	own	right.37		Roughly	speaking,	when	one	speaks	of	a	symmetry	 in	physics	one	typically	has	 in	mind	a	 set	of	operations,	acting	on	 the	state	variables	of	a	 theory,	that	leave	the	form	of	the	dynamics	unchanged.		(For	example,	when	applied	to	the	equations	 of	 special	 relativity,	 the	 transformations	 that	 map	 between	 inertially-moving	 observers	 in	 Minkowski	 spacetime	 will	 leave	 the	 structure	 of	 those	equations	unchanged.)		Such	sets	of	transformations	may	be	shown	to	form	a	group	in	the	mathematical	sense,	and	the	group(s)	under	which	a	given	equation	remains	invariant	represents	a	structural	feature	of	it.		Both	the	meaning	of	these	operations	and	 the	 significance	 of	 any	 resulting	 invariance	 are	 in	 general	 matters	 of	 much	dispute.	 But	 what	 is	 clear	 is	 that	 a	 core	 part	 of	 the	 structuralist	 package	 is	 that	symmetries	 do	 not	 have	 a	 merely	 epistemic	 or	 heuristic	 import,	 but	 rather	 the	status	of	fundamental	ontology.		
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Needless	 to	 say,	 the	 statement	 that	 a	 structural	 feature	 pertaining	 to	 the	world’s	dynamics	constitutes	a	fundamental	element	of	reality	is	one	that	requires	a	fair	bit	of	intellectual	digestion:	there	is	simply	nothing	obvious	about	what	it	means	at	all.		One	 thing	 that	 is	 clear,	 however,	 is	 that	 symmetries	 are	 not	 simply	 ‘relations	between	 particles’,	 such	 as	 entanglement	 or	 spatial	 relations.	 	 Hence	 the	relationship	 between	 these	 structures	 and	 the	 associated	 particles	 cannot	 be	 that	the	 latter	 are	mere	 ‘points	of	 intersection’	 of	 the	 former.	 	Rather,	 the	 relationship	between	 symmetries	 and	 particle	 kinds	 themselves	 can	 only	 be	 understood	 by	grinding	 through	 the	 mathematical	 machinery	 of	 group	 representation	 theory	 –	something	we	will	not	do	here.		For	now,	suffice	to	say	that	the	most	basic	field	and	particle	 content	 that	we	currently	know	of	 is	 intimately	related	 to	 the	 symmetries	we	 find	 in	 the	 most	 fundamental	 dynamics	 we	 know	 of	 –	 namely,	 the	 Standard	Model	of	particle	physics:	 the	 symmetries	of	 the	Standard	Model	 tightly	 constrain	the	possible	combinations	of	particle	content	(and	indeed	vice	versa).		Nevertheless,	it	 remains	 that	 that	particle	 content	we	 find	 in	 the	world	does	not,	 as	 a	matter	of	mathematical	 fact,	supervene	on	those	symmetry	structures.38		To	be	sure,	one	can	certainly	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 an	 ontological	 dependence	 of	 particles	 on	 symmetry	structures,	and	that	symmetries	have	to	be	placed	front	and	centre	of	how	it	is	that	we	understand	the	metaphysics	fundamental	particles	for	a	host	of	other	reasons.39		In	particular,	symmetry	gives	us	reason	to	think	that	kind	properties	do	not	simply	cohere	 (or	 ‘socialize’)	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 primitive	 metaphysical	 fact,	 and	 that	fundamental	 entities	 are	 not,	 at	 least	 not	 without	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 argument,	amenable	 to	 the	 sort	 of	 free	 recombination	 blithely	 assumed	 in	 countless	metaphysical	projects.40		For	these	and	other	reasons,	there	are	compelling	reasons	to	credit	OSR	with	offeroing	‘a	stronger	explanatory	framework	than	that	based	on	object-oriented	 metaphysics’	 (French	 2014,	 p.	 391-2).	 But	 on	 account	 of	 the	demonstrable	 failure	 of	 supervenience	 –	 something	 necessary	 (but	 not	 sufficient)	for	grounding	–	that	doesn’t	mean	that	the	sort	of	determination	needed	for	OSR	to	ground	objects	in	structures	ultimately	goes	through.			In	sum,	then,	 it	seems	that	at	present	we	cannot	affirm	that	the	most	 fundamental	objects	we	know	of	are	secondary	to	symmetry	structures.	Thus	while	structuralists	have	had	a	great	deal	to	say	about	kind	properties	and	how	they	are	understood	in	physics,	 their	 claim	 that	 kinds	 are	 grounded	 in	 symmetry	 structures	 fails	 to	 go	through.	 OSRists	 therefore	 must	 do	 something	 else	 if	 they	 are	 to	 continue	 to	maintain	 their	 core	 claim	 –	 the	 claim	 that	 structures	 have	 priority	 over	 the	fundamental	objects	of	physics.41			
4.	Concluding	remarks		What,	then,	to	say?		We	might	hold	that,	while	arguably	stuck	in	the	mud	right	now,	OSR	 could	 well	 be	 shown	 to	 be	 true	 in	 the	 future.	 	 After	 all	 –	 and	 for	 all	 that	metaphysicians	 tend	 to	 act	 as	 if	 things	 were	 otherwise	 –	 we	 are	 not	 yet	 in	possession	 of	 a	 fundamental	 theory,	 and	 so	 far	 structuralism	 has	 seemed	 only	 to	grow	ever	more	plausible	as	we	progress	into	more	fundamental	regimes.		However,	
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such	a	nakedly	speculative	and	self-flattering	claim	will	hardly	do	much	to	convert	OSR’s	 opponents.	 	 But	 one	 thing	 we	 do	 know	 is	 that	 the	 fact	 OSR	 faces	 real	challenges	 at	 present	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 it	 has	 brought	 nothing	 of	 value	 to	 the	table,	hence	nor	that	metaphysics	may	revert	to	business	as	usual	accordingly.		For	independently	 of	 whether	 (for	 example)	 the	 particles	 in	 your	 favourite	 theory	 of	particle	physics	may	be	shown	to	supervene	on	a	certain	symmetry	structure,	it	can	hardly	be	denied	that	structuralists	have	shown	symmetry	to	at	least	be	replete	with	metaphysical	 implications,	 and	 hence	 that	 metaphysicians	 ignore	 the	 structures	through	which	 physicists	 understand	 the	world	 to	 their	 own	 loss.	 	 Indeed,	 to	me	structuralism	 is,	 more	 than	 anything,	 simply	 an	 exhortation	 for	 a	 certain	
methodological	 approach	 in	 metaphysics	 –	 one	 that	 may,	 echoing	 Lakatos,	 be	conceived	of	as	a	conjunction	of	heuristics.42			The	positive	heuristic	is	the	injunction	to	 incorporate	 the	 mathematics	 relevant	 to	 the	 physicists’	 conception	 of	 the	fundamental	 when	 engaging	 in	 metaphysical	 theorizing	 about	 it;	 the	 negative	heuristic	is	to	relentlessly	police	our	tendency	to	impose	concepts	belonging	to	the	world	 of	 macroscopic	 experience	 upon	 that	 which	 lies	 beneath.	 	 And	 to	 me	 the	literature	amply	affirms	the	power	of	these	heuristics	again	and	again.		Thus	unless	we	want	metaphysics	to	continue	as	a	satellite	discipline,	wholly	disconnected	from	other	enquiries	 into	unobservable	reality,	we	should	follow	OSR’s	 lead	and	engage	more	 directly	 with	 the	 language	 in	 which	 those	 other	 disciplines	 express	themselves.		For	it	is	surely	hard	to	take	seriously	philosophy’s	claimed	respect	for	the	sciences	if	it	cannot	do	even	that	much.					
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